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Exploiting the unique economic situation after German uni¯cation, I in-
vestigate how exit decisions deviate between new ¯rms in a transition and
in a comparatively stable market environment. Two competing exit mecha-
nisms are considered in that context: entrepreneurial self-selection via vol-
untary liquidation and external selection based on the German insolvency
law. Semi-parametric competing risk models are estimated for a large ¯rm
data set. It comprises 14,000 ¯rms in all East and West German regions and
all industries in the manufacturing, construction and trade sectors as well as
most service industries. In accordance with theoretical considerations, the
empirical results suggest that distinguishing between competing exit modes is
crucial for understanding entrepreneur-, ¯rm-, ownership- and management-
related e®ects on new ¯rms' exit decisions. Entrepreneur-speci¯c character-
istics like education or age at market entry are related to the bankruptcy and
the voluntary liquidation risk according to the distinct underlying decision
rules. The e®ects of initial ¯rm size, legal form or ownership a±liations to
parent ¯rms are consistent with the expected pattern of bankruptcy avoid-
ance. Comparing East and West Germany, I ¯nd that small start-ups in East
Germany after uni¯cation had no signi¯cantly higher voluntary liquidation
hazard during the 1990s than larger ones - in contrast to small West German
start-ups. In addition, education e®ects on the voluntary liquidation risk of
new ¯rms in East and West Germany di®er and the share of liquidations
related to bankruptcy ¯lings turns out to be higher among start-ups in the
East German transition economy than in the comparatively stable West Ger-
many market economy. These results are argued to re°ect di®erent industry
structures, capital and labor market conditions.Bankruptcy and Voluntary Liquidation:





Exploiting the unique economic situation after German uni¯cation, I in-
vestigate how exit decisions deviate between new ¯rms in a transition and a
comparatively stable market environment. Two competing exit mechanisms
are considered: entrepreneurial self-selection via voluntary liquidation and
external selection based on insolvency regulation. Distinguishing between
the competing exit modes proves to be crucial in semi-parametric propor-
tional hazard-rate estimations. Comparing East and West Germany, I ¯nd
distinct education and size e®ects and a higher share of bankruptcy-related
liquidations in East Germany. These results are argued to re°ect di®erent
industry structures, capital and labor market conditions in both parts of
Germany.
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The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marks the political and
economic breakdown of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). En-
trepreneurial activity was systematically discouraged in the GDR by expro-
priations of private businesses, by restrictions on input use including employ-
ment and by high pro¯t taxation. The planned economy system of the GDR
was built on centralized production in large state-owned ¯rms. After uni-
¯cation of East and West Germany, more than 8,000 formerly state-owned
¯rms with a total of more than four million employees had to be restructured
and privatized or were liquidated. Production in these ¯rms largely broke
down during the transition to a market economy. Redundancies led to a
high level of unemployment. At the same time the monthly start-up num-
bers rose exceptionally between November 1989 and July 1990, remained
on a very high level until January 1991 and started only then to taper o®.
Since entrepreneurial activity and the emergence of new, competitive indus-
try structures are needed for economic growth the performance and behavior
of new ¯rms in East Germany is of high interest for policy-makers and re-
searchers.
In this study I investigate in detail the exit behavior of East German
¯rms started during the ¯rst transition years. In addition, I show how the
behavior of these ¯rms deviates from the one of ¯rms started during the
same time period in the comparatively stable West German market econ-
omy. To that aim the unique context after uni¯cation and comprehensive
data on about 14,000 ¯rms is exploited. The sample covers all East and
West German regions and all industries in the manufacturing, construction
and trade sectors as well as most service industries. It is drawn from a
¯rm data source currently providing information on more than six million
¯rms. The presented evidence extends the existing literature on industrial
dynamics and new ¯rm exit to an interesting economy in transition. Since
the end of the 1980s, many authors have investigated the exit behavior of
newly founded ¯rms in di®erent Western industrial economies. For example,
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988, 1989), Audretsch (1991), Audretsch
and Mahmood (1995), Mata and Portugal (1994), Geroski, Mata, and Por-
tugal (2002), and Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003) provide large sample
evidence for the United States, Portugal and United Kingdom. Existing
studies on new ¯rm exit in West Germany by BrÄ uderl, PreisendÄ orfer, and
Ziegler (1992) and Wagner (1994) are, however, based on small samples with
¯rms in speci¯c regions. About new ¯rm exit in East Germany even less is
1known.1 Most importantly, so far no study has used a data set with East and
West German ¯rms to compare the exit behavior of start-ups in a transition
and a comparatively stable market environment.
The empirical analysis in this paper builds upon a theoretical and in-
stitutional framework with two competing exit mechanisms: entrepreneurial
self-selection via voluntary liquidation and external selection based on the
German insolvency regulation. The importance of separating between dif-
ferent types of exit instead of treating exit as homogeneous is discussed for
example by Phillips and Kirchho® (1989) and Sutton (1997). However, only a
few empirical studies address the issue. Schary (1991) investigates ¯rm exit
through bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and merger using a very small
sample of 61 ¯rms in the declining cotton industry between 1924 and 1940 in
New England. The determinants of failures and acquisitions in the U.S. bank-
ing industry are analyzed by Wheelock and Wilson (2000). They use data
on about 4000 commercial banks between 1984 and 1993. Harho®, Stahl,
and Woywode (1998) examine the bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation risk
for about 11,000 West German ¯rms between 1990 and 1994. Taylor (1999)
analyzes the risk of exit via bankruptcy and moves to alternative employ-
ment between 1991 and 1995 for about 1,300 British self-employed persons
that started business activities after 1979. All these studies use samples with
¯rms of very di®erent age or self-employment spells of di®erent length at
the beginning of the respective observation period.2 In contrast, the follow-
ing study focuses on start-ups whose market activity is monitored from the
moment of market entry until up to ten years later.
The main theoretical expectations derived in the ¯rst part of the paper
are in line with the presented results of competing risk estimates for East and
West German start-ups. Entrepreneur-speci¯c characteristics like education
or age at market entry are related to the bankruptcy and the voluntary liqui-
dation risk according to the distinct underlying decision rules. The e®ects of
initial ¯rm size, legal form or ownership a±liations to parent ¯rms are consis-
tent with the expected pattern of bankruptcy avoidance. The comparison of
competing risk estimates for East and West Germany reveals similar e®ects of
the entrepreneur's age, the ¯rm's legal form, its ownership and management
structure, and franchise relations in both economic environments. Interest-
ingly, non-parametric baseline hazard estimates also indicate a quite similar
time-pattern of the exit process. The most striking di®erences between the
exit process among new ¯rms in East and West Germany after uni¯cation
1Brixy and Kohaut (1999) estimate survival function estimates using data for a time
period of four years. Determinants of exit decisions are, however, not investigated.
2For example, ¯rms in Harho®, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) are on average 29 years
old at the beginning of the observation period.
2are distinct size and education e®ects as well as the fact that a substantially
higher share of liquidations in East Germany is related to bankruptcy ¯lings
than in West Germany. These di®erences are argued to re°ect the di®erent
industry structures, capital and labor market conditions in the two parts of
Germany during the 1990s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion, I analyze the exit decision of newly founded ¯rms and discuss how
¯rm-speci¯c and entrepreneur-speci¯c characteristics are supposed to a®ect
a ¯rm's bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation risk. Section 3 contains a brief
description of the data. In section 4, I discuss the econometric model, the
estimation methods and the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Exit decision of new ¯rms: bankruptcy ver-
sus voluntary liquidation
2.1 Theoretical and institutional framework
Empirical studies on ¯rm performance and exit by Dunne, Roberts, and
Samuelson (1989), Baldwin and Ra¯quzzaman (1995), Troske (1996), Ab-
bring and Campbell (2003) and many others are motivated by the theoretical
work of Jovanovic (1982), Ericson and Pakes (1995), and Pakes and Ericson
(1998) on industry evolution with noisy selection among entrants. In Jo-
vanovic (1982) the exit process among ¯rms entering an industry is based
on passive Bayesian learning about time-invariant ¯rm productivity. Ericson
and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) model actively learning en-
trants with productivity varying over time due to stochastic market changes,
their own investment decisions and those of other market participants.
In the following, I use a framework with passive learning to examine the
exit decision of new ¯rms when both, self-selection by entrepreneurs and ex-
ternal selection according to the German insolvency regulation are at work.
Consider a population of market entrants characterized by unknown, ¯rm-
speci¯c values of a productivity parameter µ and observable ¯rm heterogene-
ity. Firms believe their value of µ at the moment of entry to be a random
draw from the same known a priori distribution conditional on observable
¯rm heterogeneity. After market entry, each ¯rm observes one realization of
a pro¯t-relevant random variable per period. This random variable is de-
noted by ´ and not observable to the econometrician. As the distribution
of ´ depends on µ, the information history nt ´ (´1;´2;:::´t) in period t
allows for updating the a priori expectation of µ and of future values of ´.
Using their posteriors, the risk-neutral and pro¯t-maximizing entrants then
3decide whether to continue the ¯rm or to liquidate it by ¯nally terminating
all business activities.3
At ¯rst, I focus on the exit decision of the most frequent type of a new ¯rm
and then extend the analysis at the end of section 2.2. The \typical" new ¯rm
is started by a single entrepreneur owning and managing the ¯rm (owner-
manager). One bank creditor usually allows for overdraft and sometimes
disburses loans. Unsecured trade creditors may provide additional ¯nancing.4
The owner-manager holds all control rights of the ¯rm as long as all
current payments on the ¯rm's debt obligations are covered. He will opt for
a voluntary liquidation in period t if his individual liquidation threshold in









The individual liquidation threshold in t consists of two parts. One part
is the expected present value Oe
t of the entrepreneur's (e) future returns
when choosing the best alternative employment opportunity. These expected
returns from wage work, an alternative ¯rm project or retirement depend
on his personal characteristics xe. The second part is the share Le
t of the
¯rm's liquidation value Lt the entrepreneur receives as residual claimant when
liquidating the ¯rm's assets in t and satisfying all creditors' claims. V e
t is his
share of the maximal expected present value in t of venture-related future
returns in case of optimal ¯rm continuation. V e
t depends on the history nt
of the pro¯t-relevant variable ´, personal characteristics xe and ¯rm-speci¯c
characteristics at market entry xf.5
As soon as the ¯rm runs into ¯nancial distress the German insolvency
regulation transfers control rights by entitling all creditors of the ¯rm as well
as the owner-manager to ¯le for bankruptcy.6 From that moment on, a ¯rm
3In this paper, I focus on exit by liquidation. Mergers, takeovers, and other changes
in ownership are not treated as exit events here because some market activities of the
concerned units continue even in the case of a fundamental restructuring.
4Harho® and KÄ orting (1998a) show that German ¯rms being younger than 6 years
have on average 1.28 bank creditors. Overdraft borrowing and trade credits are important
sources of short-term ¯nancing for start-ups (Cressy 1996b, Petersen and Rajan 1997).
5Abbring and Campbell (2003) and Geroski, Mata, and Portugal (2002) show that
initial conditions at market entry have strong, long-lasting e®ects on ¯rm survival chances
even if current conditions are controlled for.
6According to German law a ¯rm is ¯nancially distressed if either the criteria of in-
cessant inability to pay (insolvency) or overindebtedness applies (x102 Konkursordnung,
HÄ asemeyer 1998). Insolvency is ful¯lled in period t, if the ¯rm is actually and probably
also in s subsequent periods not able to meet its ¯nancial obligations: Ct < Tt + Bt
and Ct+i < Tt+i + Bt+i8 i = 1;:::;s: Ct denotes cash, Tt the payments owed to trade
creditors and Bt the sum of repayment and interest payment owed to the bank in pe-
4liquidation or restructuring can be started and realized independently of the
owner-manager's decision.
The most likely candidates for ¯nancial distress are ine±cient ¯rms with
low productivity and no market success. The liquidation value Lt of an
ine±cient ¯rm exceeds the maximal expected present value of venture-related
future returns Vt (nt;xe;xf):
Lt > Vt (nt;xe;xf): (2)
Nevertheless, e±cient ¯rms may also enter ¯nancial distress. In Ger-
many, such ¯rms can, however, be assumed to choose a private contractual
debt restructuring rather than a court procedure because of high indirect
bankruptcy costs. German bankruptcy procedures are strongly oriented to-
wards liquidation. Court reorganization procedures are rarely used, are usu-
ally unsuccessful and followed by a bankruptcy procedure (Hesselman and
Stefan 1990, HÄ asemeyer 1998). Due to this situation, ¯ling for bankruptcy
would cause high indirect bankruptcy costs for ¯rms that shall be contin-
ued. Suppliers, customers and employees with limited information about the
¯rm's prospects usually interpret a bankruptcy ¯ling as a signal of forthcom-
ing liquidation. They stop delivery, seek for alternative suppliers and search
for new jobs, respectively. Such a deterioration of business relations does not
strongly a®ect the liquidation value of the ¯ling ¯rm's assets, but consider-
ably reduces the ¯rm's going-concern value (Hax 1985). Thus, coalitions of
owners and creditors interested in ¯rm continuation have strong incentives
to choose private debt restructuring and to avoid the detrimental ¯ling. In
the following, I will often use the shorter term \bankruptcy risk" instead
of \risk of liquidation after bankruptcy ¯ling" since ine±ciency, bankruptcy
and liquidation are that closely linked in the German context.
2.2 Determinants of a new ¯rm's exit decision
According to the theoretical and institutional framework introduced above
a new ¯rm's exit can either result from entrepreneurial self-selection (see
equation (1)) or from external selection based on the insolvency regulation
(see equation (2)). Referring to both coexistent mechanisms, I now derive
riod t. Overindebtedness applies only to corporate ¯rms. A ¯rm is overindebted if the
¯rm's assets are worth less in t than the face value of its debt obligations Dt: The value
of the ¯rm's assets is measured by the maximum of the ¯rm's continuation value Vt and
liquidation value Lt. Overindebtedness is di±cult to evaluate and therefore of much less
empirical relevance in Germany than the insolvency criterion (HÄ asemeyer 1998). Note that
any detail on German insolvency regulation given in this paper refer to the legal situation
before 1999 because the data I use covers that period.
5hypotheses on the relations between entrepreneur- and ¯rm-speci¯c char-
acteristics and the ¯rm's bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation risk. The
corresponding empirical results are discussed in section 4.3.
Characteristics of the entrepreneur
Characteristics of the entrepreneur, xe, are related to the bankruptcy risk
due to their impact on venture returns and thus on the ¯rm's continuation
value in equation (2). The link between characteristics of the entrepreneur
and the voluntary liquidation risk is more complex. According to equation
(1) it depends on both, the impact of entrepreneur-speci¯c characteristics
on venture returns and the impact on returns of the entrepreneur's best
alternative employment opportunity.
Entrepreneurs with high general human capital, measured by educational
degree, are usually assumed to attain high venture returns (Cressy 1996a,
BrÄ uderl, PreisendÄ orfer and Ziegler 1992). Hence, they can be assumed to
face a lower bankruptcy risk than poorly educated entrepreneurs. High ed-
ucational degrees should, however, not only promote high venture returns
but also high individual exit thresholds due to well-paid job o®ers and good
ideas for alternative ¯rm projects (Gimeno et al. 1997, Taylor 1999). Even
assuming that the best alternative employment is wage work does not clarify
whether a positive or a negative e®ect of education on the voluntary liqui-
dation risk should be expected. Existing studies about the relative return
of education in wage work versus self-employment by Evans and Leighton
(1989) and Fujii and Hawley (1991) provide mixed evidence.
H1: Well educated entrepreneurs have ceteris paribus (c.p.) a lower
risk to exit via bankruptcy than poorly educated ones. The e®ect
of education on the voluntary liquidation risk depends on the rel-
ative strength of the education e®ect on venture returns and on
individual exit thresholds.
Bates (1990) and Cressy (1996a) use the demographic variable \age of
the entrepreneur at market entry" as a proxy for speci¯c human capital,
i.e. business and work experience. Since high experience should promote
high venture-related returns, I expect age and the bankruptcy risk to be
negatively correlated. This expectation follows as well if not only experience
but also risk-aversion and wealth increase in age (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
Rosen 1994b, Cressy 1996b).
Age is presumably not only correlated with venture-related returns but
also with the entrepreneur's exit threshold. First, the number and quality
of alternative job o®ers is likely to decrease in age and consequently the exit
6threshold should initially decrease as well. But at a certain age, retirement
considerations come into play and tend to shift the exit threshold upwards.
Retiring entrepreneurs often liquidate the ¯rm's assets rather than trans-
ferring the ¯rm as an operating unit. Harho®, Stahl, and Woywode (1998)
mention two reasons that inhibit transfers of small, young ¯rms. First, they
can often not be sold because the ¯rm's viability and pro¯tability depend
crucially on the entrepreneur's human capital. Second, the German institu-
tional setting can impede the transfer of ownership considerably.
H2: The age of the entrepreneur and the bankruptcy risk are c.p. neg-
atively correlated. The e®ect of age on the voluntary liquidation
risk is U-shaped.
Characteristics of the ¯rm project
Firm-speci¯c characteristics at market entry, xf, are correlated with both liq-
uidation risks due to their impact on venture returns. Moreover, a ¯nancially
distressed ¯rm's interest in bankruptcy avoidance as well as the attractive-
ness of an out-of-court liquidation agreement versus a court procedure may
depend on ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics.
In the empirical literature, ¯rm size is often discussed as an important
determinant of new ¯rm exit. Mata and Portugal (1994) and Audretsch and
Mahmood (1995) argue that small start-ups are more likely than large ones
to operate at sub-optimal production scale and to incur cost-disadvantages.
Caves (1998) interprets sub-optimal scale as a consequence of binding in-
put constraints. Most important are probably capital constraints caused by
rationing on imperfect capital markets (Evans and Jovanovic 1989, Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen 1994 (a,b), Blanch°ower and Oswald 1998). In
addition, small scale can signal low or imprecise ex ante pro¯t expectations
and avoidance of large sunk commitment. According to Frank (1988) and
Caves (1998) such small ¯rms are more prone to leave the market after only
a few periods with low returns than large ¯rms. Summing up, the under-
standing of small scale as disadvantage or negative signal suggests a negative
correlation between initial ¯rm size and the exit risk of start-ups.
However, certain economic environments can induce entry of small ¯rms
that are unlikely to have a higher exit risk than larger entrants. First, along
the lines of Caves and Porter (1977) ¯rms may choose to enter small in order
to ¯t into strategic market niches. Agarwal and Audretsch (1999, 2001)
provide evidence for the U. S. consistent with the hypothesis that entrants
in industries at the mature stage of the product life cycle are more likely to
occupy product niches than entrants in formative stages. In contrast to small
7start-ups in West Germany, I do not expect small-scale entrants during the
early East German transition years to face signi¯cantly higher exit risk than
their large-scale counterparts that enter into a di®erent strategic group in the
same industry. Many small start-ups are likely to have ¯lled local market
niches with a low exit risk. Middle-sized and large start-ups rather had to
compete with experienced West German and foreign ¯rms. Moreover, they
had to cope with privatized and often heavily subsidized ¯rms emerging from
the restructuring of formerly state-owned ¯rms. Second, °exible small-scale
entry and subsequent step-by-step growth based on updated expectations
should pay o® especially in uncertain and changing markets.7 Considering
that market developments were more uncertain during the transition period
in East Germany, the exit risk of small and large entrants should be more
similar in East than in West Germany.
In addition to the foregoing arguments, it is crucial to see how ¯rm size
can a®ect an exiting ¯rm's choice between an out-of-court liquidation agree-
ment and a bankruptcy procedure. First, bankruptcy procedures get increas-
ingly attractive with increasing employment due to the German insolvency
regulation. Most important, unpaid wages of ¯rms in bankruptcy will tem-
porarily be covered by the federal labor o±ce and simpli¯ed worker dismissals
via collective settlement are allowed.8 Second, the larger the ¯rm, the lower
the share of the liquidation value which is needed to cover direct bankruptcy
costs. Third, ¯rm size is typically positively correlated with the number of
creditors (Harho® and KÄ orting 1998a). Hence, informational asymmetries
and the risk of free-riding tend to increase in ¯rm size and the chances for a
successful out-of-court agreement decrease.
H3: The relation of ¯rm size and the bankruptcy risk has c.p. an in-
verted U-shape. Firm size and the voluntary liquidation risk are
negatively correlated in West Germany but probably not in East
Germany.
Some start-ups opt for a diversi¯ed ¯rm concept by entering several in-
dustries at once. According to portfolio theory, diversi¯cation can serve as a
risk-reducing investment strategy by combining projects with negatively or
7See Geroski (1991, 1995) for a discussion and the model of Mills and Schumann (1985).
Mills and Schumann (1985) assume that small ¯rms have higher minimum average costs
than their larger competitors but a more °exible production technology due to a high share
of variable costs. These °exible small ¯rms are shown to be more successful in industries
with high rather than low demand °uctuations.
8As the labor o±ce covers due wage payments including social security contributions,
bankruptcy ¯lings by social security agencies become increasingly likely the more employ-
ees are concerned. HÄ asemeyer (1998) discusses the relevant regulation.
8imperfectly positively correlated returns. Rose (1992) shows in a theoretical
model for entrepreneurial ¯rms that owner-managers choose costly diversi¯-
cation if it reduces the ¯rm's liquidation risk and thus increases the expected
value of their ¯rm-speci¯c human capital. Following Jovanovic (1993), di-
versi¯ed ¯rms may also realize cost advantages by exploiting economies of
scope.
H4: Diversi¯ed start-ups have c.p. a lower risk of bankruptcy and vol-
untary liquidation than non-diversi¯ed start-ups.
Start-ups participating as franchisee in business format franchising pay
a fee and royalties to receive a detailed business plan and a trade name
(Lafontaine and Shaw 1999). Applying an already tested business plan is
probably less risky than developing and using a new one. Well-known trade
names can help to attract customers. Moreover, Rubin (1978) and Bates
(1995) discuss that franchisers may pre-select and train their franchisees as
well as facilitate access to ¯nancial resources.
H5: Franchisees have c.p. a lower risk of bankruptcy and voluntary
liquidation than non-franchise entrants.
As discussed by Harho®, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) the legal form of a
start-up in Germany can be interpreted as a signal for project risk since it
determines the liability status of the owners.9 Entrepreneurs who want to
start a highly risky project tend to choose a legal form with limited liabil-
ity rather than full liability.10 Fully liable owners risk all their distrainable
personal wealth and usually have continuing obligations after the completion
of a bankruptcy procedure due to the German insolvency law in force until
1999.11 Thus, a rational, risk-neutral owner-manager with full liability will
liquidate voluntarily rather than continue a ¯rm he considers to be ine±cient.
In contrast, owners with limited liability are only liable up to the amount of
their equity share. Thus, the residual ¯rm value for such an owner resembles
a call option and is c.p. at least as high to him as to a fully liable owner.
Consider a situation with asymmetric information between a rational, risk-
neutral owner-manager with limited liability and the ¯rm's creditors. If then
the ¯rm turns out to be ine±cient, the owner-manager may not liquidate
9Moreover, legal fees, disclosure and taxation rules as well as the mode of ownership
change depend on the legal form. I omit these aspects because they are of minor relevance
here.
10Note here that German law allows for limited liability companies started by one person
alone.
11After bankruptcy all creditors with unmet claims are entitled to pursue these claims
against any distrainable future earnings and pro¯ts of the debtors (HÄ asemeyer 1998).
9voluntarily but increase his expected residual ¯rm value at the expense of
the creditors by shifting to a riskier project with the same or a lower expected
value than the initial project (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Such a behavior will
increase the risk of ¯nancial distress and thus bankruptcy.
H6: Firms with fully liable owners have c.p. a lower bankruptcy risk
than ¯rms with limited liability. The relation between liability
status and voluntary liquidation risk is ex ante not clear.
Ownership and management of the ¯rm
So far, I referred to the \typical" new ¯rm started by a single owner-manager.
But start-ups can have several owner-managers and the owner team can in-
clude other ¯rms. Di®erent internal control and management situations are
presumably a crucial factor a®ecting the bankruptcy and voluntary liquida-
tion decision of new ¯rms.
Firms started by a team of owner-managers should be endowed with a
higher human capital stock than start-ups with only one owner-manager
because de¯ciencies of one team member's education or experience can be
compensated by others (Cressy 1996a). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990)
mention specialization of team members for di®erent tasks as an additional
advantage. Altogether, team start-ups tend to attain higher venture returns
than other start-ups and will consequently face a lower bankruptcy risk.
However, team members may disagree about central issues and prefer-
ences can turn out to be incompatible (Wagner, Pfe®er and O'Reilly 1984,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990). If a team fails to build up a viable orga-
nization and breaks apart, one or several owner-managers will probably leave
the ¯rm and may trigger a voluntary liquidation. They will hardly wait until
the ¯rm's decline forces it into bankruptcy.
H7: Team start-ups are c.p. less likely to exit via bankruptcy than
¯rms not managed by a team. The existence of a team has ex
ante no clear impact on the voluntary liquidation risk.
Some ¯rms are partly or fully owned by parent ¯rms when starting their
business activities. Such a±liates often bene¯t from the parent ¯rm's net-
work, funding, and knowledge (Mata and Portugal 2002). Most important, I
expect Western a±liations of East German start-ups to compensate for insuf-
¯cient managerial skills as well as lacking marketing, accounting and institu-
tional knowledge. Such de¯ciencies were substantial at the beginning of the
economic transition in East Germany (Dyck 1997). All these resource-based
advantages of a±liations should increase venture returns and thus lower the
10risk of liquidation.
However, a±liated ¯rms may have higher liquidation values than non-
a±liated ones. Among others, Baden-Fuller (1989), Liebermann (1990) and
Deily (1991) argue that in case of liquidation an a±liate's assets and em-
ployees and along with it some of its speci¯c capital and human capital may
be successfully transferred to the parent ¯rm.
These arguments and the two following reasons imply a low bankruptcy
risk for a±liated ¯rms but not necessarily a lower voluntary liquidation risk.
Firstly, a parent ¯rm is often fully liable for its a±liate's obligations and
the a±liate can not default as long as the parent ¯rm is not bankrupt itself.
Full liability is implied by several types of ¯rm relations, for example by
agreements to transfer pro¯ts (HÄ asemeyer 1998). Full liability of the parent
¯rm can also result from declarations of patronage and explicit or implicit
guarantees often asked for by the a±liate's creditors. Secondly, even in cases
where bankruptcy of the a±liate is independently feasible, parent ¯rms of-
ten cover the a±liate's obligations and may liquidate it voluntarily (Li and
Guisinger 1991). They do so in order to preserve their own reputation on the
credit market and to prevent customers and suppliers from interpreting the
a±liate's default as a signal of ¯nancial problems of the parent ¯rm itself.
H8: A±liated start-ups have c.p. a lower bankruptcy risk than non-
a±liated ones. The relation between a±liation and voluntary liq-
uidation risk depends on the relative importance of the a±liation
e®ect on venture returns, of the a±liation e®ect on liquidation
values, and of bankruptcy avoidance. East German start-ups with
an a±liation to Western parent ¯rms have lower liquidation risks
than other a±liated start-ups in East Germany.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a large ¯rm sample well suited for analyz-
ing and comparing exit decisions of new ¯rms in East and West Germany.
To set it up a strati¯ed random sample with 10,000 East and 12,000 West
German ¯rms was drawn from two complementary ¯rm panels maintained at
the Centre of European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim. Currently,
the East and the West German panel cover altogether more than six million
¯rms. The data are provided by the leading German credit rating agency,
called Creditreform, approximately every six months.12 Creditreform collects
12Credit rating data is also used by Phillips and Kirchho® (1989), Audretsch (1995),
and Harho®, Stahl, and Woywode (1998).
11information on legally independent, active ¯rms either proactively or on de-
mand. Information collection from public registers, newspapers, company
reports, and in ¯rm interviews is an ongoing process such that the frequency
of information updating varies among ¯rms. A typical ¯rm record in the pan-
els provides a lot of information about ¯rm formation, insolvency ¯lings and
liquidation. Moreover, it indicates the ¯rm's location, industry classi¯cation,
number of employees, legal status, ownership and management details.13
Now, I brie°y comment on three issues crucial in the context of the follow-
ing empirical analysis. Firstly, I want to compare ¯rm behavior in East and
West Germany during the decade right after uni¯cation. The East and West
German panel at the ZEW are well suited for that purpose since Creditreform
uses standardized data collection and cleaning procedures. Such compara-
tive studies are of high interest since obtaining reliable data for transition
economies and comparing it to data for Western market economies is typi-
cally very di±cult (Filer and Hanousek 2002).
Secondly, data on a well-de¯ned population of start-ups should be used
to analyze exit decisions of new ¯rms. Creditreform collects information on
¯rms of any size or legal form in all industries and regions. Comparisons with
other data bases conducted by Harho® and Steil (1997) show that ¯rms hav-
ing several employees or being registered in the trade register are very well
covered in Creditreform's data base.14 In contrast to many other data bases,
micro ¯rms with often only one owner-manager, no additional employee and
no trade register entry are also covered.15 Such ¯rms may, however, be un-
derrepresented and may enter the data base only some time after market
entry.16 Since late recording is correlated with ¯rm survival and implies
missing information on start-up characteristics, all ¯rms entering Creditre-
form's data base more than one year after the ¯rst recorded formation date
were eliminated from the panel population before drawing the sample.
Being interested in start-ups during the ¯rst years after uni¯cation, only
¯rm records with a primary or secondary ¯rm formation date between 1990
13Further information on ZEW ¯rm panels can be found in Almus, Engel, and Prantl
(2000) and Harho®, Stahl, and Woywode (1998).
14Registration in the trade register is compulsory for all commercial partnerships, limited
liability ¯rms, stock companies and large sole proprietorships (x1, x106 and x162 Handels-
gesetzbuch (HGB), x7 GmbH-Gesetz, x36 Aktiengesetz). Sole proprietorships classi¯ed as
small businesses according to x2 HGB, freelances, ¯rms in the agricultural sector and civil
law associations do not appear in the trade register.
15In the main sample used below a large share of ¯rms, i.e. 23.5 percent, has only one
employee including owner-manager and no trade register entry.
16The extent of undercoverage is unknown since none of the o±cial ¯rm statistics covers
all existing entrepreneurial activity in Germany.
12and 1993 were considered.17 After drawing the sample of 22,000 ¯rms about
4,000 pages of Creditreform's free °ow text material were analyzed in detail
and encoded for the purpose of this study, because it contains important
and comprehensive information on ¯rm formation and liquidation events not
provided in coded form. It turned out that 3,484 ¯rms in the sample started
their business activity before 1990. A legal form change, a relocation or an
ownership change did cause the secondary formation date between 1990 and
1993. These ¯rms were deleted in order to restrict the empirical analysis to
¯rms starting market activity between January 1, 1990 and December 31,
1993.
Thirdly, detailed liquidation data is needed for an analysis of di®erent
exit types. Firm liquidation is de¯ned here as the termination of all business
activities and the sell-o® of the ¯rm's assets. This is usually accompanied
by a deregistration of the ¯rm from the trade or business register. When
Creditreform detects the liquidation of a ¯rm, it records information about
it mainly in the free °ow text already mentioned. Thus, the text infor-
mation on liquidations between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999
was extracted for all 22,000 ¯rms. A large telephone survey conducted in
1999/2000 provides further data about the activity status of 5,299 ¯rms in
the sample.18 Liquidations were classi¯ed as bankruptcy-related or voluntary
based on Creditreform's comprehensive data on bankruptcy ¯lings and pro-
ceedings. This insolvency information is highly reliable for several reasons.
First, a credit rating agency needs complete and accurate information about
a ¯rm's solvency. Second, information about insolvency proceedings is pub-
licly accessible due to compulsory publication in newspapers and o±cial reg-
isters. Facing time and money restrictions, a sample well suited for analyzing
¯rm exit was obtained by oversampling ¯rms approximately twofold if one
of several indicator variables coded by Creditreform suggested a liquidation.
The disproportionally strati¯ed choice-based sampling feature increased the
sample variation that is crucial for the empirical analysis presented below.
However, the dependence of the sampling rule on the endogenous variable
has to be taken into account in all estimation and test procedures.19
After having eliminated the 3,484 ¯rms already in business before 1990,
I applied three further exclusion restrictions. 927 records on holding com-
panies, part-time projects, and legally dependent ¯rm units were removed.
17Per ¯rm and panel wave there exist three data ¯elds called formation date 1 - 3.
Creditreform stores primary formation dates in these ¯elds. Moreover, secondary dates
caused by legal form changes, relocations or ownership changes do also enter.
18A description of this telephone survey provide Almus et al. (2001).
19See Manski and McFadden (1981) and Angrist and Krueger (1999) for further discus-
sion and section 4.1 for details.
131,794 ¯rm records had to be eliminated because of missing information on
¯rm characteristics at market entry, inconsistencies or typing errors. More-
over, I did not use 2,028 ¯rms in the main analysis because human capital
information, i.e. information on education and age, was not available for these
¯rms.20 Table 1 contains the de¯nitions of all variables used and descriptive
statistics for the main sample of 13,767 ¯rms.
4 Competing risk analysis
In the following, I present the empirical analysis with voluntary liquidations
and liquidations linked to bankruptcy ¯lings in East and West Germany.
In Section 4.1, I brie°y describe the applied semi-parametric hazard rate
model and estimation techniques. Non-parametric, strati¯ed baseline hazard
estimates are discussed in section 4.2. The baseline hazard estimates shed
light on the time-pattern of the ¯rms' learning after market entry and on the
exit behavior of ¯rms with di®erent legal forms. In addition, the structure
of the exit process in East and West Germany can be compared. Estimated
covariate e®ects are explained in section 4.3.
4.1 Econometric model and estimation techniques
For the competing risk analysis, a semi-parametric, continuous-time propor-
tional hazard rate model with two mutually exclusive absorbing states is
used. Distinguishing between liquidation after bankruptcy ¯ling b and vol-
untary liquidation v I de¯ne two latent liquidation times T b and T v for each
¯rm (Kalb°eisch and Prentice 1980, Cox and Oakes 1984). The observable





. The observed type of liquidation L takes value L = l if
T = T l where l 2 fb;vg. The following hazard function hl(t;X = x) depicts
the instantaneous probability of liquidation type l:








where X denotes a vector of time-constant covariates, x a realization of
X and t indicates time since ¯rm formation.
This unobservable function hl(t;X = x) equals the observable hazard
function
20Robustness of the empirical results for ¯rm characteristics with respect to this last
exclusion restriction is shown in table 4.
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for all t and l if the random variables T b and T v are mutually independent.
Assuming independence, the likelihood function can be factorized into addi-
tive, separable terms for each liquidation type l. Each type-speci¯c hazard
can be estimated with a single-risk model where ¯rms exiting by the compet-
ing type of liquidation are treated as censored at the moment of liquidation
(Petersen 1995).
20.1 percent of the ¯rms in the sample ran into liquidation after a
bankruptcy ¯ling, 19.5 percent liquidated voluntarily.21 The remaining 60.4
percent have uncompleted duration spells and are censored in all estimations.
87.5 percent of these uncompleted spells are right-censored at the end of the
observation period. 12.5 percent are censored earlier because Creditreform
stopped updating the ¯rm record after a relocation or an ownership change.
Estimating a continuous-time model is considered appropriate here, since the
process of interest is continuous in time. Moreover the duration of a ¯rm's
market activity can be measured in days such that tied duration spells occur
only rarely.22
To estimate the type-speci¯c hazard functions I used the following strat-
i¯ed version of the Cox proportional hazard model:
h




with l 2 fb;vg and s = 1;2: (5)
The coe±cient vector ¯l can be estimated without specifying the strati¯ed
baseline hazard function hl
0;s(t) by maximizing a partial likelihood function
(Cox 1972, 1975). Since the observations are choice-based sampled from
the parent population, I used the weighted maximum likelihood estimator
proposed by Manski and Lerman (1977) and the robust variance-covariance
matrix estimator of Lin and Wei (1989).
One separate baseline hazard function hl
0;s(t) was estimated for each stra-
tum group by applying a non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator. I used a
legal form indicator as strati¯cation variable since its linear modeling in the
exponential factor of equation (5) would not have been appropriate. Graphi-
cal investigations and statistical tests along the line of Kalb°eisch and Pren-
tice (1980) and Grambsch and Therneau (1994) indicated non-proportional
hazard functions for di®erent legal form groups.
21All shares mentioned in this paragraph are non-weighted shares.
22The data base provides exact dates for all ¯rm formation and most liquidation events.
Whenever only the month and year of a liquidation is registered, I imputed the date into
the 15th of the respective month.
154.2 Baseline hazard estimates
In this section, I discuss baseline hazard estimates that show the relation
of new ¯rms' exit decisions to learning, liability status and the economic
environment. The baseline hazards displayed in ¯gure 1 are calculated for
the model in equation (5). The corresponding estimates of the coe±cient
vectors ¯l with l 2 fb;vg are presented in table 3 and discussed in section
4.3. In ¯gure 1, the graphs for East German ¯rms refer to retail ¯rms started
in 1990 in Saxony-Anhalt. The graphs for West German ¯rms refer to retail
¯rms started in 1990 in North Rhine-Westphalia. In both the East and West
German graphs the ¯rms have mean employment (6 employees), mean owner-
manager age (37 years), no diversi¯ed ¯rm concept, no franchise contract, no
¯rm a±liation, and one owner-manager who completed an apprenticeship or
some other type of low education.
The four graphs in ¯gure 1 reveal a non-linear pattern of the baseline
hazard functions for the bankruptcy and the voluntary liquidation risk. This
pattern is valid not only for ¯rms in the reference group, but also for all
other ¯rms in the sample because other covariate values induce proportional
shifts of the estimated baseline hazards due to the underlying model structure
in equation (5).23 Following Pakes and Ericson (1998), non-linear baseline
hazard functions are consistent with Jovanovic's passive learning model dis-
cussed in section 2.1.24 Many functional forms of the model imply that it
takes time to accumulate a history nt with realizations of the pro¯t-related
variable ´ that is su±ciently informative to ensure the optimality of a ¯rm
liquidation. Accordingly, the instantaneous liquidation risk of new ¯rms in-
creases in time during the initial periods after market entry. But at some
point, it starts to decrease because from then on ¯rms still active in period
t are less likely to be ine±cient, have more precise knowledge about their
initially unknown productivity parameter µ and are less prone to liquidate
than active ¯rms in period t ¡ 1.
The strati¯cation variable distinguishes between two ¯rm groups. One
group covers non-public limited liability ¯rms and the few stock companies in
23A non-linear pattern of the exit risk when all liquidation types are pooled was found
by BrÄ uderl, PreisendÄ orfer, and Ziegler (1992) and Wagner (1994) for two speci¯c regions
in West Germany. These early results are, however, not directly comparable to mine
because I control for observable ¯rm heterogeneity. BrÄ uderl, PreisendÄ orfer, and Ziegler
(1992) present proportional log-logistic hazard estimates without covariates and Wagner
(1994) discusses life table estimates.
24Pakes and Ericson (1998) stress that the passive learning model is in line with di®erent
shapes of the hazard function. It does not necessarily imply a monotonously decreasing
hazard function which was associated with the model of Jovanovic (1982) by Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and in related work.
16Figure 1: Baseline Hazard Estimates
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Note: Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier baseline hazard estimates referring to retail ¯rms
started in 1990 in Saxony-Anhalt (North Rhine-Westphalia) with mean employ-
ment, mean owner-manager age, no diversi¯ed ¯rm concept, no franchise contract,
no ¯rm a±liation, and one owner-manager who completed an apprenticeship or
some other type of low education.
the sample. According to the German business law, owners of such corporate
¯rms are only liable up to the amount of their equity share. The other group
consists of all non-corporate legal forms in the sample: sole proprietorships,
civil law associations and commercial partnerships. These non-corporate
¯rms have at least one owner who is fully liable with all his distrainable
17personal wealth.
In East and West Germany, limited liability ¯rms have a substantially
higher bankruptcy hazard than ¯rms with fully liable owner-managers. By
contrast, the levels of the voluntary liquidation hazards are not that di®erent.
According to graphs A and B the bankruptcy hazard of East German limited
liability ¯rms is at least two and a half times as high as the bankruptcy hazard
of East German full liability ¯rms surviving more than two and a half years.
For West German ¯rms surviving more than one and a half years, graphs C
and D exhibit a bankruptcy hazard in case of limited liability which is at
least ¯ve times higher than in case of full liability. Altogether, this evidence
on the relation between a ¯rm's liability status and its liquidation hazards is
in line with hypothesis H6 in section 2.2.
Comparing graphs B and D indicates a deviating structure of the exit pro-
cess in the transition economy in East Germany and the stable West German
market environment. The bankruptcy hazard for East German limited lia-
bility ¯rms relative to their voluntary liquidation hazard is higher than for
West German ¯rms in the group the ¯gures refer to. A similar pattern can
be observed in graphs A and C for full liability ¯rms. Before interpreting
this result, it has to be checked whether it holds for all other ¯rms in the
sample.25 When looking at the whole sample population, 39.17 percent of
all liquidations in East Germany are related to bankruptcy ¯lings, but only
28.78 percent of those in West Germany. To show that the observed gap is not
simply a consequence of the di®erent composition of the East and the West
German ¯rm population with respect to industry, size or legal form table 2
describes the composition of the East and West German sample population
and shows the structure of the exit process in several sub-samples.
The second and third column in table 2 indicate the shares of each in-
dustrial sector, size class and legal form class in the East and West German
sample population. In the fourth column the results of two-tailed tests of the
null hypothesis stating equality of the means in column 2 and 3 are shown.
East German start-ups belong more often to the sectors construction and
retail trade and less often to wholesale or intermediate trade and services
than West German ones. In contrast to West German ¯rms, East German
¯rms appear more often in the two upper size classes and less often in the
group of ¯rms with only 1 employee including the owner-manager. East Ger-
man start-ups are more often organized as sole proprietorships or commercial
partnerships and less often as limited liability ¯rms or stock companies. The
25Note that each curve in the graphs B and D or A and C results from the estimation of
another model. Hence, stability of the described pattern is not guaranteed for other ¯rm
groups by proportionality of the hazards within a model.
18¯fth and sixth column in table 2 show for each sub-sample in East and
West Germany which share of liquidations is linked to bankruptcy ¯lings.
Column 7 indicates a signi¯cantly higher bankruptcy share in East than in
West Germany for all legal form classes, both the higher size classes and the
manufacturing, construction, retail trade and transport and communication
sectors.
This result is very interesting since it is not simply caused by di®erent
insolvency regulation in East and West Germany.26 At ¯rst, the result can
be linked to di®erences in capital availability and capital use in both parts
of Germany. Private capital accumulation in East Germany before uni¯ca-
tion was low such that East German entrepreneurs after uni¯cation typically
started their ¯rms with a lower share of private equity and collateral than
West German entrepreneurs. According to Harho® and KÄ orting (1998b)
banks charged East German ¯rms after uni¯cation with less than 500 em-
ployees c.p. signi¯cantly higher interest rates for lines of credits than West
Germany ones. However, the government supported East German invest-
ment by substantial investment allowances, investment grants and special
depreciation provisions not available to ¯rms in West Germany (Sinn 1995).
In addition, subsidized loans were more generously o®ered to start-ups in
East than in West Germany (Prantl 2003). Despite these government in-
terventions, Harho® and KÄ orting (1998b) ¯nd that East German ¯rms are
c.p. signi¯cantly less likely to take advantage of fast payment discounts on
trade credits than West German ¯rms. Thus, they pay implicit interest rates
that are much higher than rates charged by banks which indirectly reveals
binding ¯nancial constraints (Petersen and Rajan 1994). Stronger ¯nancial
constraints imply a higher risk of ¯nancial distress and are thus consistent
with a higher share of bankruptcy-related liquidations in East than in West
Germany.
Di®erent labor market situations in East and West Germany are also
likely to contribute to the higher share of bankruptcy cases among all liq-
uidations in East Germany. Labor market conditions a®ect the individual
liquidation threshold of entrepreneurs. After uni¯cation, the restructuring
of large, formerly state-owned ¯rms triggered a huge number of dismissals
in East Germany and the labor market situation remained precarious dur-
ing the 1990s. The East German rate of registered unemployment varied
between 10.3 and 19.5 percent during the 1990s whereas the West German
rate remained at a lower level between 6.3 and 11.0 percent. Furthermore,
the number of registered open positions per person was lower in East than in
26The German insolvency law after uni¯cation was implemented in the same way in
East and West Germany (HÄ asemeyer 1998).
19West Germany (SachverstÄ andigenrat 2000/2001). Taking into account low
regional mobility of German job seekers, the individual liquidation thresholds
of entrepreneurs in East Germany should be lower than in West Germany.
According to equation 1 this implies a lower propensity to liquidate volun-
tarily and can thus contribute to a higher share of bankruptcy-related liqui-
dations. Further evidence in line with an impact of labor market conditions
on the exit process among new ¯rms is presented in the next section.
4.3 Covariate e®ects on the hazards
Now, I turn to empirical evidence related to those hypotheses of section 2.2
not dealt with in the foregoing section. Firstly, I concentrate on the risk-
speci¯c e®ects of management and ownership covariates. Especially interest-
ing insights can be gained by distinguishing between di®erent types of ¯rm
a±liations in East Germany. Secondly, basic human capital e®ects, more
complex human capital e®ects in team start-ups as well as ¯rm size e®ects
are shown to be risk-speci¯c and to depend on the economic environment in
East and West Germany.
In the East German competing risk regressions in table 3 all 6,236 East
German ¯rms in the sample of 13,767 ¯rms with human capital information
are used. In the West German regressions 7,531 ¯rms are used. The co-
variate vector X covers the human capital variables and ¯rm characteristics
mentioned in section 2.2. In addition, several control variables are used to
capture cohort-, industry- and location-speci¯c e®ects.27 All results in table
3 I comment on are robust with respect to substantial sample variation. As
can be seen in table 4, the regressions based on an extended sample includ-
ing all 15,795 ¯rms with or without human capital information con¯rm the
discussed e®ects of ¯rm characteristics. Moreover, the regressions in table 5
for the reduced sample of 9,050 ¯rms that are owned and managed by one
entrepreneur and not a±liated to other ¯rms indicate quite similar results
as in table 3 for those human capital and ¯rm characteristics usable in both
samples.
The regressions in table 3 include several indicator variables capturing
di®erent internal control and management situations. These variables are
27Three indicator variables for the ¯rm formation years 1991, 1992, and 1993 are jointly
signi¯cant in both regressions for East Germany and in the voluntary liquidation regression
for West Germany. In addition to 5 (10) indicators for East (West) German states I use
a measure of the population density in the district of ¯rm location to control for location-
speci¯c e®ects. I ¯nd signi¯cant hazard-increasing agglomeration e®ects in both equations
for East Germany. Finally, 18 (18) industry dummies at the two-digit level are meant to
account for industry-speci¯c e®ects. These are always jointly signi¯cant.
20used since the sample includes not only ¯rms owned and managed by a
single entrepreneur but also team start-ups and start-ups with a±liations
to other ¯rms.28 The dummy variable TEAM is coded one if a start-up
is managed by a team of persons. Table 3 displays a signi¯cant, negative
coe±cient of TEAM in the bankruptcy equations for East and West Germany.
Thus, the bankruptcy hazards are found to be signi¯cantly lower for team
start-ups in both parts of Germany than for ¯rms started by a single owner-
manager. Hence, I do not ¯nd evidence against the higher average human
capital stock or better work organization in team start-ups that are in line
with hypothesis H7. TEAM is signi¯cantly and positively correlated with
the voluntary liquidation hazard in both parts of Germany. This result is in
line with the view that team members are unlikely to wait for bankruptcy
but liquidate voluntarily if the initial team of owner-managers breaks apart.
In the regressions for West Germany, the variable FULL AFFIL indicates
whether a start-up is a subsidiary, i.e. whether it is fully a±liated to a parent
¯rm, or not. PART AFFIL is coded one if a start-up is no subsidiary but has
at least one ¯rm among its owners. Subsidiaries and partly a±liated start-
ups exit signi¯cantly less often in connection with a bankruptcy ¯ling than
non-a±liated ¯rms. But subsidiaries and partly a±liated ¯rms are as prone
as non-a±liated ¯rms to liquidate voluntarily. In accordance with hypothe-
sis H8, the results suggest the empirical relevance of bankruptcy avoidance
induced by declarations of patronage, guarantees or by reputation e®ects.
The fact that the coe±cient of FULL AFFIL is lower than the coe±cient of
PART AFFIL in both the bankruptcy and the voluntary liquidation equa-
tion points towards stronger resource-based advantages of fully than of partly
a±liated start-ups. The null hypothesis of equal coe±cients could, however,
not be rejected using Wald-tests.
In the regressions for East Germany, I can exploit information on
owner location to distinguish between full and partial a±liations to East
German or Western ¯rms (FULL AFFIL EAST, FULL AFFIL WEST,
PART AFFIL EAST, PART AFFIL WEST). FULL AFFIL EAST has a
signi¯cant positive e®ect on the voluntary liquidation risk and all other in-
dicators do not a®ect the voluntary liquidation hazard signi¯cantly. By con-
trast, the bankruptcy hazard of start-ups fully or partly a±liated to Western
¯rms is signi¯cantly lower than the one of non-a±liated start-ups. The co-
e±cients for subsidiaries of East German ¯rms and of other East German
a±liates remain insigni¯cant. In both the bankruptcy and voluntary liqui-
dation equation the sign and size pattern of the four coe±cients suggests
2829.4 percent of all ¯rms in the sample are team start-ups. 7.4 percent are partly
a±liated to other ¯rms and 2.3 percent are subsidiaries.
21stronger hazard-reducing e®ects of a±liations to Western ¯rms than to East
German ¯rms. Western parent ¯rms seem to promote a new East German
¯rm's prospects successfully by providing valuable management support and
funding or by integration into a market-proven network. There is also statis-
tical support for the superiority of Western a±liations since the coe±cients of
PART AFFIL EAST and PART AFFIL WEST in the bankruptcy equation
as well as the coe±cients of FULL AFFIL EAST and FULL AFFIL WEST
in the voluntary liquidation regression di®er signi¯cantly according to Wald-
tests.
Given the sample composition, I use the following indicator variables
to capture educational degrees of individual owner-managers or managers
and the mixture of degrees in owner-manager or manager teams. The vari-
able MASTER CRAFT is coded one if a ¯rm is either owned and man-
aged or managed by a single person with high vocational training indicated
by the master craftsman degree. It is also coded one in case of a team
of owner-managers or managers who all have a master craftsmen degree.
The other dummies indicate graduate degrees in business administration or
economics (BUS ADMIN), engineering (ENGINEERING), other academic
¯elds (OTHER GRADUATE), apprenticeships or other forms of low educa-
tion (LOW EDUC), and missing degree information (EDUC UNKNOWN).
GRAD MIX is coded one if a team consists of members with at least two
di®erent types of graduate degrees. OTHER MIX indicates heterogeneous
teams with at least two educational degrees out of the following groups:
LOW EDUC, MASTER CRAFT and graduate degrees. Using this set of
indicator variables provides a su±ciently °exible speci¯cation of the model
according to the following test results. Interaction terms between the team
indicator and all education dummies referring to both, start-ups by individ-
uals and teams, remain jointly insigni¯cant in any of the equations in table
3. Interactions between the education dummies with an indicator coded one
for fully or partly a±liated ¯rms are jointly insigni¯cant as well.29 Note that
the coe±cient of EDUC UNKNOWN remains insigni¯cant in three equations
and is signi¯cant only at the 10-percent signi¯cance level in the East Ger-
man bankruptcy equation. This and the comparison of the results in tables 3
and 4 discussed at the beginning of this section suggest that missing human
capital information raises no selectivity concern when estimating liquidation
risk equations with the data at hand.
29Interacting the education indicators and the indicator of subsidiaries was not feasible
since many cells contained an insu±cient number of observations. An interaction between
an indicator of any type of high education and the indicator of subsidiaries is found to be
insigni¯cant in three of the four equations and signi¯cant at the 10-percent level in only
one equation.
22West German ¯rms managed by a person or a team of persons with a
graduate degree in business administration or economics, engineering or any
other ¯eld, face a signi¯cantly lower bankruptcy hazard than ¯rms managed
by persons with low education. In the voluntary liquidation equation, all vari-
ables that indicate a graduate degree remain insigni¯cant. This pattern is
consistent with hypothesis H1 according to which graduation promotes high
venture returns as well as high returns in alternative employment. Thus, the
individual liquidation thresholds of graduates are su±ciently high to render
the indicators of graduate degrees insigni¯cant in the voluntary liquidation
equation. Taylor (1999) ¯nds no signi¯cantly lower bankruptcy hazard and
a signi¯cantly higher chance of moving to alternative employment for self-
employed British men with high education than for those with low education.
Interestingly, his results indicate the same structural di®erence between the
two competing exit mechanisms as my analysis. In contrast to the pattern
discussed so far, the coe±cient for master craftsmen is signi¯cant and neg-
ative in both, the bankruptcy as well as the voluntary liquidation equation.
This result may be caused by less favorable wage o®ers for master craftsmen
than for graduates since self-employment is traditionally high in the German
crafts industries. Moreover, the master craftsman degree is an important in-
stitutional entry barrier in many areas of business activity in Germany. Thus,
the master craftsman coe±cient may partly re°ect the survival-enhancing ef-
fect of this entry barrier not captured by the two-digit industry dummies that
are included in all regressions.
In East Germany, ¯rms managed by master craftsmen or engineers have
a signi¯cantly lower bankruptcy hazard than ¯rms managed by persons with
low education. In addition, the coe±cient for ¯rms managed by persons with
a graduate degree in business administration or economics is also negative
and signi¯cant at the 10-percent signi¯cance level.30 In contrast to West
Germany, not only ¯rms of master craftsmen but also ¯rms of engineers have
a signi¯cantly lower voluntary liquidation hazard than those of persons with
low education. This result indicates that East German engineers who became
self-employed after uni¯cation face less favorable alternative employment op-
30This result was unexpected. Persons that graduated in business administration or
economics in East Germany before the breakdown of the planned economy should have
accumulated a lot of system-speci¯c knowledge being useless when managing a start-up
after uni¯cation. One possible explanation for the estimation result is the following. The
group of persons in the East German subsample with a degree in business administration
or economics may cover a high share of migrants from West Germany. Given that I can
not control for the West or East German origin of persons with the data at hand, such
migrants may cause the signi¯cant negative coe±cient of BUS ADMIN in the bankruptcy
equation.
23portunities than engineers who started a ¯rm in West Germany.
In West Germany, ¯rms with heterogeneous teams (GRAD MIX,
OTHER MIX) have a signi¯cantly lower bankruptcy hazard than ¯rms man-
aged by homogeneous teams of persons with low education. In case of teams
with more than one type of graduate degree (GRAD MIX) the bankruptcy
hazard is also signi¯cantly lower than for homogeneous teams of master
craftsmen. A di®erent pattern is found for East Germany. In contrast to
homogeneous teams of master craftsmen, engineers or economists, hetero-
geneous teams have no signi¯cantly lower bankruptcy hazard than homoge-
neous teams with low education.31 This di®erence between East and West
German evidence can be related to the literature in organization science
about the composition of teams. Following Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bour-
geois (1997) and Lawrence (1997) heterogeneity in teams is costly because the
time needed for discussion and decision-making increases with heterogeneity.
The bene¯t of heterogeneity is argued to be a higher propensity of innova-
tive problem solutions, for example a new product idea or an unconventional
marketing concept. Therefore, heterogeneous teams can be expected to be
less successful in economic environments rewarding quick decision-making
rather than unconventional ideas. As explained in the following, the evi-
dence I ¯nd for East and West Germany is in line with this expectation.
West German start-ups during the 1990s faced stable industry structures
and well established, incumbent competitors such that they had to come
up with new ideas to win a lasting market position. By contrast, the East
German transition economy seems to have o®ered ¯rst-mover advantages to
quickly deciding ¯rms entering with a main-stream concept. In this environ-
ment, heterogeneous teams with a high potential for innovative ideas ran as
often into bankruptcy as teams with low education, probably because of a
too time-consuming decision process.
The age variable MEAN AGE is the mean age of the start-up's owner-
manager or manager team. As in the case of education indicators, including
interaction terms between the age variable and the team indicator turned out
to be insigni¯cant in all four equations in table 3. Interaction terms with the
indicator for subsidiaries or an indicator for full and partial a±liations were
also statistically insigni¯cant in all equations. Age is signi¯cantly negatively
correlated with the bankruptcy hazards in East and West Germany. This is
31Since the dummies GRAD MIX and OTHER GRADUATE are insigni¯cant in the
bankruptcy equation for East Germany an alternative speci¯cation with two dummies in-
stead of GRAD MIX was also tested. One dummy indicated the graduate teams consisting
of persons with degrees in economics or engineering. The other one indicated all other
mixed graduate teams. The alternative speci¯cation lead to the same conclusions as the
one used in table 3.
24consistent with the e®ects of work-experience, risk-aversion and wealth on
venture-related returns as expected in hypothesis H2. The e®ect of age on
both voluntary liquidation hazards is signi¯cant and non-monotonous. In
East Germany, persons or teams with a (mean) age of about 41 years have
a lower voluntary liquidation hazard than others. In West Germany, the
minimum is reached at about 35 years. The age e®ects found here suggests
that human capital decay as discussed by Bates (1990), Cressy (1996a) and
Storey and Wynarczyk (1997) does probably not cause the inverse U-shaped
age e®ects on ¯rm survival chances they report. Human capital decay should
a®ect not only the voluntary liquidation hazard but also the bankruptcy
hazard. Hence, the business and work experience of entrepreneurs starting
a ¯rm at high age could only be judged to su®er from depreciation if I
observed a U-shaped age e®ect on both competing hazards. By contrast,
I observe an upward shifted voluntary liquidation hazard but a downward
shifted bankruptcy hazard in the upper part of the age distribution. The
positive age e®ect on the voluntary liquidation hazard in the upper part of
the age distribution is thus more likely to re°ect increasing individual exit
thresholds and retirement decisions.
Firm size at market entry is measured by the logarithm of SIZE, i.e. the
number of employees including owner-managers in full-time equivalents. In
the bankruptcy equations, I use a quadratic polynomial to capture the im-
pact of ¯rm size. Harho®, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) use a similar speci¯ca-
tion in a bankruptcy risk equation for a sample including mature ¯rms. The
marginal e®ect of ¯rm size on the bankruptcy hazard is initially positive. For
East (West) German ¯rms with more than 25 (18) employees, it is negative.
This suggests that the feasibility and attractiveness of out-of-court liquida-
tions for ¯nancially distressed ¯rms decreases with ¯rm size as explained
when discussing hypothesis H3 in section 2.2. BrÄ uderl, PreisendÄ orfer, and
Ziegler (1992), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), and Mata and Portugal
(1994) among others report negative correlation of entry size and the pooled
exit risk. All these studies do not distinguish between competing liquida-
tion types and address start-up survival in Western economies. I observe
a signi¯cant, negative coe±cient of entry size in the voluntary liquidation
equation for West Germany. In the voluntary liquidation regression for East
Germany, however, the negative coe±cient turns out to be insigni¯cant. This
East-West di®erence is in line with hypothesis H3. In contrast to small West
German start-ups, small start-ups in East Germany after the breakdown of
the planned economy had no higher voluntary liquidation hazard than larger
start-ups. Probably, they occupied market niches with good survival chances.
Another explanation can be that small-scale °exibility is more advantageous
for start-ups coping with uncertain market conditions and unsettled indus-
25try structures during the transition of East Germany than for new ¯rms in
West Germany. My results for a transition and a stable market economy
add to the evidence on the size-survival correlation provided by Agarwal and
Audretsch (1999, 2001) for di®erent stages of the industry life-cycle.
Hypothesis H4 about diversi¯cation as a hazard-reducing strategy has to
be rejected. The variable DIVERSIFIED which indicates ¯rms that start in
more than one 5-digit industry has positive, insigni¯cant coe±cients in two
of the four equations. The e®ect on the voluntary liquidation hazard in East
Germany is positive and signi¯cant. These results can be related to negative
diversi¯cation e®ects on ¯rm pro¯tability, productivity and sales reported
by Berger and Ofek (1995), Schoar (2002), and Nguyen Van, Kaiser, and
Laisney (2003). Along the lines of Schoar (2002) my results for the exit risks
of German start-ups can be explained by distraction of the owner-managers
from core competencies and overtaxing due to the number and complexity
of arising management tasks.
Firms that start as a franchisee (FRANCHISEE) have signi¯cantly lower
bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation risks than other start-ups in East and
West Germany. Thus, I ¯nd support for hypothesis H5 in two di®erent eco-
nomic environments. By contrast, Bates (1995) reports a signi¯cantly higher
exit probability for franchisees than for non-franchise ¯rms in a sample of
sole proprietorships, partnerships and S-corporations founded in the United
States between 1984 and 1987. When I restrict my sample to sole propri-
etorships and partnerships I still ¯nd reduced hazards for franchisees in all
equations. However, in two of the four equations the negative coe±cients
then fail to pass the 10-percent signi¯cance level.
Summing up, the presented competing risk analysis reveals that the links
of many ¯rm characteristics to the bankruptcy risk of German start-ups after
uni¯cation di®er systematically from those to their voluntary liquidation risk.
These di®erences re°ect the distinct underlying decision rules introduced in
section 2.1. Moreover, the empirical results show how exit of new ¯rms in
the East German transition economy deviates from exit of new ¯rms in the
West German market economy.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the exit behavior of new ¯rms facing compet-
ing modes of exit in two di®erent economic environments. In contrast to
most existing studies of ¯rm exit, I distinguish between entrepreneurial self-
selection via voluntary liquidation and external selection via liquidation after
a bankruptcy ¯ling. Related research on competing exit risks is extended
26in several respects. The patterns of basic human capital e®ects as well
as the more complex human capital e®ects in team start-ups suggest that
entrepreneur-speci¯c characteristics are related to the bankruptcy hazard of
start-ups according to their impact on venture returns and thus on the contin-
uation value of the ¯rm. By contrast, human capital e®ects on the voluntary
liquidation hazard of start-ups re°ect the human capital impact on venture
returns but also on the entrepreneurs' alternative employment opportuni-
ties and thus on their liquidation thresholds. Age of the owner-managers at
market entry has a non-linear, U-shaped e®ect on the voluntary liquidation
hazard. Such non-linear age e®ects are often explained by human capital
decay in the literature on the pooled exit risk. However, I observe a linear
negative e®ect of age on the bankruptcy hazard not explainable by human
capital decay. Hence, the U-shaped age e®ect on the voluntary liquidation
hazard does rather re°ect retirement decisions of old entrepreneurs than hu-
man capital decay. Firm size is found to have a non-linear, inverted-U e®ect
on the bankruptcy hazard, but not on the voluntary liquidation hazard. The
initial increase is in line with the view that the feasibility of out-of-court
liquidation agreements decreases in ¯rm size due to increasing information
asymmetry and free-riding among creditors. Moreover, employee-related in-
solvency regulations in Germany render court-procedures more attractive for
larger ¯rms. Indicators of the ¯rm's legal form, of ownership a±liations to
parent ¯rms and of team start-ups a®ect the bankruptcy and voluntary liq-
uidation hazards di®erently as well. Summing up, distinguishing between
di®erent types of exit augments the understanding of the exit behavior of
new ¯rms.
The comparison of new ¯rm exit during the 1990s in East and West
Germany is of particular interest because of the unique economic context.
East German ¯rms in the sample started between 1990 and 1993, i.e. at
the beginning of the transition from a planned to a market economy. By
contrast, the West German start-ups entered a comparatively stable market
economy. The comparison reveals several di®erences and similarities as well.
In both economic environments, ¯rm characteristics like a ¯rm's legal form at
market entry, the existence of ownership a±liations to parent ¯rms, franchise
relations and start-up teams are related to the bankruptcy and voluntary
liquidation hazards in a similar way. In addition, non-parametric baseline
hazard estimates exhibit a similar time-pattern. Entrepreneurs and creditors
in East Germany seem to take time for collecting market experiences before
realizing liquidations in a comparable way as in West Germany.
The most interesting di®erences between new ¯rm exit in East and West
Germany during the 1990s can be related to the di®erent industry struc-
tures, capital and labor market conditions. In contrast to small West Ger-
27man start-ups, small start-ups in East Germany after uni¯cation had no sig-
ni¯cantly higher voluntary liquidation hazard during the 1990s than larger
ones. They seem to have occupied market niches with low exit risks whereas
middle-sized and large start-ups competed with experienced Western ¯rms
and heavily subsidized, privatized East German ¯rms. This result adds to
the evidence on the size-survival correlation provided by Agarwal and Au-
dretsch (1999, 2001) for di®erent stages of the industry life-cycle. In addition,
education e®ects on the voluntary liquidation risk of new ¯rms in East and
West Germany di®er and the share of liquidations related to bankruptcy ¯l-
ings turns out to be higher among start-ups in the East German transition
economy than in the comparatively stable West Germany market economy.
The latter can be explained by stronger ¯nancial constraints in East than
in West Germany. Both the deviating human capital e®ects and the weaker
entrepreneurial self-selection in East Germany are in line with lower volun-
tary liquidation thresholds of East German entrepreneurs. Lower voluntary
liquidation thresholds are a plausible consequence of higher local unemploy-
ment rates and correspondingly worse alternative employment opportunities
in East than in West Germany.
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Table 1: De¯nition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Variable De¯nition Mean/ Standard
Share Deviation
Continuous Firm and Human Capital Variables
survival time duration of market activity in days un-
til liquidation or censoring date (at latest
31/12/1999)
2188.59 992.52
SIZE number of employees incl. working owner per-
sons
6.309 22.146
MEAN AGE mean age of the (owner-) managers (see notes) 37.300 9.023
Discrete Firm and Human Capital Variables
bankruptcy liquidation liquidation after bankruptcy ¯ling during ob-
servation period until 12/31/1999
0.201
voluntary liquidation voluntary liquidation during observation pe-
riod until 12/31/1999
0.195




ltd. liability & stock corp. limited liability ¯rm, stock company (GmbH,
AG)
0.426
civil law association civil law association (GBR) 0.088
commercial partnership commercial partnership (KG, OHG) 0.013
sole proprietorship sole proprietorship (Einzelunternehmung,
Gewerbebetrieb)
0.473
FULL AFFIL fully a±liated, i.e. completely owned by one
¯rm
0.023
PART AFFIL partly a±liated, i.e. one or more owner ¯rms
but not fully a±liated
0.074
TEAM more than one (owner-) manager 0.294
EDUC UNKNOWN (team with) no recorded educational informa-
tion
0.254
LOW EDUC (team with) apprenticeships or low education 0.423
MASTER CRAFT (team with) master craftsman degree(s) 0.086
continued on next page
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Variable De¯nition Mean/ Standard
Share Deviation
BUS ADMIN (team with) graduate degree(s) in business ad-
ministration
0.024
ENGINEERING (team with) graduate degree(s) in engineering 0.099
OTHER GRADUATE (team with) other graduate degree(s) 0.023
GRAD MIX team with at least 2 di®erent graduate degrees 0.012
OTHER MIX team with 2 educational levels out of






wholesale & int. trade wholesale and intermediate trade 0.126
retail trade retail trade 0.254
transport & comm. transport and communication 0.065
services services 0.263
Cohort Indicators
cohort 1990 ¯rm formation in 1990 0.274
cohort 1991 ¯rm formation in 1991 0.261
cohort 1992 ¯rm formation in 1992 0.220
cohort 1993 ¯rm formation in 1993 0.246
Continuous and Discrete Regional Variables
POPUL DENSITY (# inhabitants/(square kilometer*1000)) in
1992 at district level
0.998 1.190
West Germany ¯rm location in West Germany 0.547
Notes: The table displays non-weighted descriptive statistics for the sample of 13,767 ¯rms. 65.7% of the
¯rms in the sample have only one owner-manager and no ¯rm a±liation such that the human capital
variables refer to this person. Otherwise, the human capital variables refer to the team of owner-
managers or managers. The population density information comes from the Bundesamt fÄ ur Bauwesen
und Raumordnung.
37Table 2: Exit Process in East (E) and West (W) German industries, size
classes and legal form classes
Firm Group Population Share in % Bankruptcy Share in %
E W E W
Total
100.00 100.00 39.17 28.78 ***
Industry
manufacturing 11.58 11.97 55.97 37.46 ***
construction 20.92 12.62 *** 62.63 46.05 ***
wholesale & intermed. trade 10.99 12.67 *** 37.41 35.06
retail trade 29.19 24.84 *** 24.60 18.90 ***
transport & communication 6.90 6.29 35.99 24.76 **
services 20.41 31.61 *** 29.07 25.30
Size
1 employee 25.39 39.56 *** 16.47 17.43
2 - 10 employees 59.25 55.84 *** 38.25 33.61 ***
> 10 employees 15.36 4.60 *** 70.34 51.29 ***
Legal form
ltd. liab. & stock corp. 35.50 38.83 *** 21.21 10.49 ***
civil law association 9.33 9.56 18.99 9.18 ***
sole prop. & com. part. 55.17 51.61 *** 65.56 49.83 ***
Note: The table shows weighted shares for the sample of 6,281 East German and 7,583 West German ¯rms.
Column 2 (3) shows the shares of each industry, size and legal form class in the East (West) German
sample population. Column 5 (6) indicates for each of these classes in East (West) Germany which
share of liquidations is linked to bankruptcy ¯lings. *** (**, *) indicates signi¯cance of a t-test
statistic in a two-tailed test at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The tested null hypothesis is equality of the
means in the groups of East and West German ¯rms.
38Table 3: Competing Risk Model with Bankruptcy (B) and Voluntary Liqui-
dation (V)
East Germany West Germany
B V B V
Independent Variable Coe±cient
(Robust Standard Error)
TEAM -0.251*** 0.312*** -0.172** 0.311***
(0.085) (0.091) (0.076) (0.072)
FULL AFFIL -0.417* 0.127
(0.217) (0.236)
FULL AFFIL EAST -0.279 0.667**
(0.288) (0.281)
FULL AFFIL WEST -0.787*** -0.420
(0.240) (0.374)
PART AFFIL -0.256** 0.142
(0.112) (0.119)
PART AFFIL EAST -0.155 0.039
(0.133) (0.184)
PART AFFIL WEST -0.671*** -0.316
(0.168) (0.231)
EDUC UNKNOWN -0.232** -0.000 -0.096 -0.079
(0.105) (0.081) (0.093) (0.068)
MASTER CRAFT -0.551*** -0.246* -0.479*** -0.367***
(0.129) (0.142) (0.140) (0.138)
BUS ADMIN -0.371* -0.064 -0.704*** -0.221
(0.208) (0.221) (0.209) (0.206)
ENGINEERING -0.400*** -0.467*** -0.604*** -0.175
(0.098) (0.129) (0.142) (0.155)
OTHER GRADUATE 0.017 0.254 -0.529** 0.229
(0.211) (0.191) (0.211) (0.175)
GRAD MIX -0.185 -0.091 -1.112*** 0.137
(0.219) (0.291) (0.355) (0.283)
OTHER MIX -0.156 0.001 -0.380*** 0.056
(0.120) (0.144) (0.130) (0.125)
MEAN AGE -0.009** -0.093*** -0.011*** -0.033*
(0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.020)
MEAN AGE2 0.001*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(SIZE) 0.809*** -0.026 0.459*** -0.115***
(0.109) (0.042) (0.087) (0.042)
ln(SIZE)2 -0.126*** -0.080***
(0.024) (0.023)
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East Germany West Germany
B V B V
DIVERSIFIED 0.059 0.179*** 0.054 -0.000
(0.071) (0.068) (0.070) (0.063)
FRANCHISEE -0.937*** -0.491** -0.453* -0.436**
(0.245) (0.202) (0.263) (0.195)
POPUL DENSITY 0.119*** 0.087** 0.045 0.008
(0.039) (0.038) (0.033) (0.028)
Wald-statistic (Â2 (degrees of freedom))
Size Variables 74.08 (2)*** 0.36 (1) 36.46 (2)*** 7.65 (1)***
A±liation Indicators 25.53 (4)*** 9.45 (4)* 8.08 (2)** 1.58 (2)
Age Variables 4.54 (1)** 13.99 (2)*** 8.93 (1)*** 5.03 (2)*
Education Indicators 29.40 (7)*** 19.12 (7)*** 48.57 (7)*** 12.51 (7)*
Cohort Indicators 30.94 (3)*** 8.73 (3)** 1.88 (3) 13.96 (3)***
Industry Indicators 47.65 (18)*** 72.39 (18)*** 62.56 (18)*** 76.43 (18)***
Location Indicators 4.83 (5) 12.30 (5)** 22.72 (10)** 7.41 (10)
Model 276.62 (44)*** 201.13 (44)*** 231.53 (47)*** 176.98 (47)***
log Likelihood -5420.12 -8851.97 -4996.45 -12798.51
# observations 6236 7531
Notes: The table shows the estimation results of Cox proportional hazard-rate models for East and West
Germany using the main sample of 13,767 ¯rms. Reference ¯rms in East (West) Germany have the
following characteristics: one owner-manager with apprenticeship or some other type of low education,
no ¯rm a±liations, no diversi¯ed ¯rm concept, no franchise contract, cohort 1990, retail trade industry,
Saxony-Anhalt (North Rhine-Westphalia). *** (**, *) indicates that the coe±cient or the coe±cients
di®er signi¯cantly from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signi¯cance level.
40Table 4: Competing Risk Model with Bankruptcy (B) and Voluntary Liqui-
dation (V), Extended Sample
East Germany West Germany
B V B V
Independent Variable Coe±cient
(Robust Standard Error)
TEAM -0.161** 0.284*** -0.135** 0.321***
(0.069) (0.079) (0.066) (0.062)
FULL AFFIL -0.641*** 0.073
(0.196) (0.208)
FULL AFFIL EAST -0.109 0.597**
(0.242) (0.250)
FULL AFFIL WEST -0.814*** -0.527
(0.236) (0.367)
PART AFFIL -0.348*** 0.182*
(0.101) (0.107)
PART AFFIL EAST -0.107 -0.140
(0.121) (0.179)
PART AFFIL WEST -0.660*** -0.029
(0.155) (0.180)
ln(SIZE) 0.766*** -0.057 0.409*** -0.093**
(0.102) (0.039) (0.079) (0.039)
ln(SIZE)2 -0.121*** -0.083***
(0.022) (0.020)
DIVERSIFIED 0.063 0.150** 0.091 -0.028
(0.067) (0.064) (0.065) (0.059)
FRANCHISEE -0.868*** -0.445** -0.520** -0.548***
(0.229) (0.181) (0.254) (0.193)
POPUL DENSITY 0.124*** 0.094*** 0.033 0.037
(0.037) (0.035) (0.030) (0.027)
Wald-statistic (Â2 (degrees of freedom))
Size Variables 75.81 (2)*** 2.15 (1) 28.40 (2)*** 5.71 (1)**
A±liation Indicators 28.26 (4)*** 8.86 (4)* 20.67 (2)*** 2.93 (2)
Cohort Indicators 39.81 (3)*** 8.14 (3)** 2.08 (3) 18.56 (3)***
Industry Indicators 59.45 (18)*** 97.50 (18)*** 81.83 (18)*** 102.20 (18)***
Location Indicators 5.80 (5) 12.38 (5)** 17.20 (10)* 8.01 (10)
Model 262.35 (36)*** 173.13 (35)*** 179.85 (39)*** 164.80 (38)***
log Likelihood -6072.69 -10394.38 -5775.93 -14575.12
# observations 7119 8676
Notes: The table shows the estimation results of Cox proportional hazard-rate models for East and West
Germany using an extended sample with 15,795 ¯rms. As the data records of 2,028 ¯rms in this
sample contain no human capital information, all human capital variables (incl. age variables) used
for the regressions in table 3 are excluded here. Reference ¯rms in East (West) Germany have the
following characteristics: one owner-manager, no ¯rm a±liations, no diversi¯ed ¯rm concept, no
franchise contract, cohort 1990, retail trade industry, Saxony-Anhalt (North Rhine-Westphalia). ***
(**, *) indicates that the coe±cient or the coe±cients di®er signi¯cantly from zero at the 1% (5%,
10%) signi¯cance level.
41Table 5: Competing Risk Model with Bankruptcy (B) and Voluntary Liqui-
dation (V), Reduced Sample
East Germany West Germany
B V B V
Independent Variable Coe±cient
(Robust Standard Error)
EDUC UNKNOWN -0.182 -0.004 -0.066 -0.072
(0.122) (0.092) (0.109) (0.077)
MASTER CRAFT -0.671*** -0.248 -0.415** -0.596***
(0.159) (0.163) (0.167) (0.173)
BUS ADMIN -0.376 0.043 -0.562** -0.091
(0.279) (0.268) (0.269) (0.249)
ENGINEERING -0.516*** -0.432*** -0.521*** -0.013
(0.134) (0.159) (0.187) (0.196)
OTHER GRADUATE -0.339 0.183 -0.880*** 0.219
(0.287) (0.231) (0.286) (0.219)
MEAN AGE -0.006 -0.087*** -0.011** -0.042*
(0.005) (0.030) (0.005) (0.023)
MEAN AGE2 0.001*** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(SIZE) 1.061*** -0.004 0.443*** -0.100**
(0.134) (0.051) (0.113) (0.056)
ln(SIZE)2 -0.174*** -0.062*
(0.032) (0.034)
DIVERSIFIED 0.022 0.149* 0.031 0.026
(0.100) (0.085) (0.091) (0.077)
FRANCHISEE -0.644** -0.376* -0.530 -0.572**
(0.300) (0.228) (0.342) (0.240)
POPUL DENSITY 0.093* 0.047 0.046 -0.035
(0.053) (0.049) (0.045) (0.036)
Wald-statistic (Â2 (degrees of freedom))
Size Variables 78.94 (2)*** 0.01 (1) 27.72 (2)*** 3.86 (1)**
Age Variables 1.31 (1) 9.78 (2)*** 5.25 (1)** 3.48 (2)
Education Indicators 25.33 (5)*** 10.09 (5)* 23.09 (5)*** 13.65 (5)**
Cohort Indicators 8.75 (3)** 7.26 (3)* 1.41 (3) 7.96 (4)**
Industry Indicators 20.75 (18) 45.88 (18)*** 55.69 (18)*** 59.39 (18)***
Location Indicators 1.32 (5) 13.59 (5)** 12.48 (5) 7.86 (10)
Model 153.69 (37)*** 116.06 (37)*** 137.88 (42)*** 135.63 (42)***
log Likelihood -2607.61 -5755.58 -2607.56 -8042.04
# observations 4040 5010
Notes: The table shows the estimation results of Cox proportional hazard-rate models for East and West
Germany using a reduced sample with 9,050 ¯rms owned and managed by one entrepreneur and
not a±liated to other ¯rms. Thus, the indicators for teams, ¯rm a±liations or heterogeneous teams
contained in the regressions in table 3 are not used here. Reference ¯rms in East (West) Germany
have the following characteristics: owner-manager with apprenticeship or some other type of low
education, no diversi¯ed ¯rm concept, no franchise contract, cohort 1990, retail trade industry, Saxony-
Anhalt (North Rhine-Westphalia). *** (**, *) indicates that the coe±cient or the coe±cients di®er
signi¯cantly from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) signi¯cance level.
42